CPLR 3212(e): Partial Summary Judgment Denied in Personal Injury Action by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 45 
Number 2 Volume 45, December 1970, Number 
2 
Article 20 
December 2012 
CPLR 3212(e): Partial Summary Judgment Denied in Personal 
Injury Action 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1970) "CPLR 3212(e): Partial Summary Judgment Denied in Personal Injury 
Action," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 45 : No. 2 , Article 20. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol45/iss2/20 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
CPLR 3212(e): Partial summary judgment denied in personal injury
action.
Since the landmark decision of Di Sabata v. Soffes,94 plaintiffs in
personal injury actions have been permitted to avail themselves of the
expeditious remedy of summary judgment. Although this much is clear,
a new obstacle has arisen. In Enker v. Slattery Construction Co.,95 the
Appellate Division, Second Department, denied plaintiff's motion for
partial summary judgment 6 on the issue of defendant's negligence since
it was conceded that plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence
was still in issue. The court reasoned that the negligence issues were so
intertwined that even if partial summary judgment were granted, a con-
sideration of defendant's negligence would of necessity be involved in
a determination of plaintiff's contributory negligence.
If the defendant's negligence is so closely related to plaintiff's
contributory negligence that the issues would reappear notwithstanding
partial summary judgment, then the Enker result is sound. Indeed, in
this instance, the issue sought to be summarily resolved is still dis-
putable and cannot be determined as a matter of law. 97 Nonetheless, it
should not be presumed that Enker has dosed the door to 3212(e)
relief in personal injury actions. Rather, each case should be deter-
mined on an ad hoc basis. As a practical matter, the application of
CPLR 3212(e) in personal injury actions would greatly relieve the
court's congested calendar.
CPLR 3213: Bank and mortgage instrument deemed not to constitute
an instrument for the payment of money only.
A motion under CPLR 3213 for summary judgment in lieu of
complaint is potentially an expeditious means of arriving at judgment.
However, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding which "pre-
sumptively meritorious" claims will fall within a particular court's
conception of an "instrument for payment of money only." This
dilemma is attributable to two factors: first, the "motion-action"9 83 did
not exist prior to the CPLR and consequently there is a lack of
94 9 App. Div. 2d 297, 193 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Ist Dep't 1959).
95 34 App. Div. 2d 673, 310 N.Y.S.2d 729 (2d Dep't 1970).
96 CPLR 3212(e) provides that "summary judgment may be granted as to one or
more causes of action, or part thereof, in favor of one or more parties, to the extent war-
ranted, on such terms as may be just."
97 CPLR 3212(b).
98 Because an action under CPLR 3213 can be prosecuted with the facility of a mo.
tion, it has been styled a "motion-action." See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3213, commentary
1 at 829 (1970).
